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Just as shared language can serve to foster community, lan-
guage differences can be a source of division. Language elicits a
response from others, ranging from admiration and respect, to
distance and alienation, to ridicule and scorn. Reactions of the
latter type all too often result from or initiate racial hostility.'
I. INTRODUCTION
A recent United States Supreme Court decision, Hernandez v.
New York, 2 raises interesting questions about the ability of bilin-
gual persons to serve as jurors. The Hernandez Court, applying
Batson v. Kentucky,3 which prohibits the discriminatory use of pe-
remptory challenges" based on the juror's race, upheld as racially
1. Hernandez v. New York, 111 S. Ct. 1859, 1872 (1991).
2. 111 S. Ct. 1859 (1991).
3. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
4. In its pure form, a peremptory challenge is "one exercised without a reason stated,
without inquiry and without being subject to the court's control." Swain v. Alabama, 380
U.S. 202, 220 (1965). Peremptory challenges are provided for by statute in every state. Id. at
217. Nothing in the Constitution guarantees a right to peremptory challenges. See, e.g., Stil-
son v. United States, 250 U.S. 583, 586 (1919).
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neutral the exclusion of two bilingual Hispanic jurors 5 over the de-
fendant's claim that exclusion on the basis of Spanish-language
ability constituted a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.' The
jurors were stricken based on the prosecutor's asserted fear that
they would not be able to accept the official translation of Spanish-
language testimony. The prosecutor's race-neutral explanation
rested on three claims: first, the jurors' hesitation and lack of eye
contact in response to his questions about their ability to extend
unqualified acceptance to the court interpreter's translation;7 sec-
ond, his uncertainty over which jurors were Hispanic; and third,
his asserted lack of motive to exclude Hispanics from the jury.'
Applying a "clearly erroneous" standard of review,9 the Her-
nandez plurality 0 refused to overturn the state trial judge's deter-
mination that the prosecutor's explanation was not a pretext for
racial discrimination.1 Justice Kennedy's opinion for the Court
did, however, recognize that bilinguals can perform a valuable
function by bringing the two language "communities" they inhabit
closer together.12 It also exhibited an awareness of the relationship
between language and concepts of culture, personhood, and com-
5. The prosecutor challenged all the Hispanic potential jurors People v. Hernandez,
552 N.E.2d 621, 621 (N.Y. 1990), aff'd sub nom. Hernandez v. New York, 111 S. Ct. 1859
(1991). Three of the challenged jurors were the only members of the venire with definite
Hispanic surnames. 111 S. Ct. at 1865. The ethnicity of the other challenged juror was
deemed uncertain by the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, in People v. Her-
nandez 140 A.D.2d 543, 543 (2d Dep't 1988), aff'd, 552 N.E.2d 621, aff'd sub nom. Her-
nandez v. New York, 111 S. Ct. 1859 (1991), although Hernandez contended that the fourth
challenged juror was Latino. Brief for Petitioner at 3, Hernandez v. New York, 111 S. Ct.
1859 (1991) (No. 89-7645). Hernandez did not raise his claim of discrimination with respect
to two of the excluded jurors with brothers who had been convicted of crimes. 111 S. Ct. at
1864.
6. Hernandez v. New York, 111 S. Ct. 1859, 1866 (1991).
7. Id. at 1864-65. Although the jurors' answer was that they could accept the official
translation, the prosecutor felt the jurors would not be able to view the "interpreter as the
final arbiter of what was said by each of the witnesses" and that "they would have an undue
impact on the jury." Id.
8. Id. The prosecutor maintained that he would have no reason to exclude Hispanics
from the jury because the defendant, the victims, and the main witnesses were all Hispanic.
Id. at 1864-65.
9. Id. at 1871.
10. Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court. He was joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist, and Justices White and Souter. Id. at 1863. Justice O'Connor, joined by Justice
Scalia, concurred in the judgment. Id. at 1873 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice Blackmun
dissented, as did Justice Stevens, who was joined, in a separate opinion by Justice Marshall.
Id. at 1875 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
11. 111 S. Ct. at 1869.
12. Id. at 1872.
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munity.15 The Court declared that its decision "does not imply
that exclusion of bilinguals from jury service is wise or even consti-
tutional in all cases." '14 In fact, the Court suggested a procedure to
avoid excluding bilingual jurors: permit Spanish-speaking jurors to
advise the judge in a discreet way of any concerns with the transla-
tion during the trial. 5
Part Two of this Note presents pertinent Sixth Amendment
and Equal Protection concerns regarding jury selection. Next, Part
Three argues that, because the standard of review virtually ties ap-
pellate courts' hands in all but the most blatant instances of dis-
crimination, it is incumbent upon trial courts to recognize the
harm of such exclusions and safeguard against them. Part Four in-
troduces modern theories of language and its relationship to
knowledge and perception. It argues that, in accordance with the
ideal that an impartial jury be drawn from a fair cross-section of
the community," bilinguals form a valuable interpretive commu-
nity that should not be excluded from jury service. It argues fur-
ther that the decision to exclude a juror due to a perceived inabil-
ity to accept the official translation is not only a highly subjective
criterion, but is based on an outmoded understanding of language
and may sacrifice basic rights of the jurors17 and the defendant18
for the sake of securing acceptance of the "official translation."1 9
Finally, Part Five proposes a method for implementing Justice
Kennedy's suggestion of juror participation and concludes that it is
a viable alternative to outright exclusion.
13. "Language permits an individual to express both a personal identity and member-
ship in a community and those who share a common language may interact in ways more
intimate than those without this bond." Id. at 1872.
14. Id. The significance of such statements by the Hernandez plurality is highlighted
by contrast to the concurrence of Justice O'Connor, who stated, "[T]he plurality opinion
goes farther than it needs to in addressing the constitutionality of the prosecutor's asserted
justification for his peremptory strikes." Id. at 1873. She asserted, "No matter how closely
tied or significantly correlated to race the explanation for a peremptory strike may be, the
strike does not implicate the Equal Protection Clause." Id. at 1874.
15. Id. at 1868.
16. See infra part II.A.
17. Powers v. Ohio, 111 S. Ct. 1364, 1370 (1991) (extending the right not to be excluded
from a jury on the basis of race to jurors).
18. See infra notes 48-56 and accompanying text (discussing defendant's right not to
have jurors excluded on the basis of race); infra note 40 and accompanying text (discussing
defendant's right not to have jurors excluded on the basis of their membership in various
distinctive groups).
19. Hernandez, 111 S. Ct. at 1868.
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II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. The Sixth Amendment Cross-Section of the Community
Requirement
The Sixth Amendment mandates that a criminal defendant be
tried by "an impartial jury."20 Over the years courts have inter-
preted this to require that the jury be drawn from a fair cross-
section of the community.2 The Supreme Court, extending the
cross-section requirement of the Sixth Amendment to the states in
Taylor v. Louisiana,2 defined the function of the jury as to "guard
against the exercise of arbitrary power-to make available the
commonsense judgment of the community."' 3 It concluded that
"[riestricting jury service to only special groups or excluding iden-
tifiable segments playing major roles in the community cannot be
squared with the constitutional concept of jury trial."' 4 The Court
did not require that the composition of each petit jury actually
mirror the make-up of the community, only that various distinc-
tive groups in the population not be systematically excluded from
the jury pool.' 5
In Peters v. Kiff,' the Court recognized that the harm from
systematic exclusion of any large and identifiable segment of the
community transcends the issue of race.17 The effect of systematic
exclusion is "to remove from the jury room qualities of human na-
ture and varieties of human experience, the range of which is un-
known and perhaps unknowable.""8 The Court explained that ex-
20. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The Sixth Amendment provides, in part: "In all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial
jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed." Id.
21. The Court first articulated the representative quality of the jury in the context of
an Equal Protection claim in Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 130 (1940), declaring, "It is part
of the established tradition in the use of juries as instruments of public justice that the jury
be a body truly representative of the community." Id. One of the Court's first expressions of
the cross-section requirement came in Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 86 (1942),
where it stated that the jury should not be "the organ of any special group or class" and
warned officials composing lists of potential jurors against making selections "which do not
comport with the concept of the jury as a cross-section of the community." Id.
22. 419 U.S. 522 (1979).
23. Id. at 530.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 538.
26. 407 U.S. 493 (1972) (holding that a criminal defendant of any race has standing to
challenge the system used to select the jury on due process grounds).
27. Id. at 503-04.
28. Id. at 504.
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clusion "deprives the jury of a perspective on human events that
may have unsuspected importance" in a trial.29
As interpreted by the Supreme Court, the Sixth Amendment
fair cross-section requirement is somewhat broader in scope than
the Equal Protection Clause regarding the nature of the groups it
protects from exclusion. For example, the Court has used the
cross-section requirement to prohibit the exclusion of women3" and
daily-wage earners31 from the jury pool. The Equal Protection
Clause has thus far been held only to prohibit peremptory chal-
lenges on the basis of race.32
The Court held, in Holland v. Illinois,33 that the fair cross-
section requirement of the Sixth Amendment does not prohibit
discriminatory use of peremptory challenges. " Rather, it merely
requires that the jury pool be assembled from a cross-section of the
community. 5 However, it seems illogical that the Sixth Amend-
ment would forbid the exclusion of protected, distinctive groups
from the jury pool, but then allow members of the same distinctive
group to be excluded with peremptory challenges simply because
of their membership in that group.30 As the dissent in Holland re-
marked, "A defendant's interest in obtaining the 'commonsense
judgment of the community' is impaired by the exclusion from his
jury of a significant segment of the community; whether the exclu-
sion is accomplished in the selection of the venire or by peremp-
tory challenges is immaterial. 37
The argument is not that a defendant has a right to a jury
that reflects every distinctive group in society. It is, instead, that
purposeful exclusion of jurors because of their membership in a
distinctive group, regardless of the method, denies the defendant
the possibility of a fair cross-section of the community.38
29. Id.
30. Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187 (1946).
31. Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co., 328 U.S. 217 (1946).
32. See, e.g., Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986); Powers v. Ohio, 111 S. Ct 1364
(1991).
33. 110 S. Ct. 803 (1990).
34. Id. at 806.
35. Id.
36. Cf. JON M. VAN DYKE, JURY SELECTION PROCEDURES: OUR UNCERTAIN COMMITMENT
TO REPRESENTATIVE PANELS 162 (1977)(noting that, because of their ability to turn a repre-
sentative jury into a nonrepresentative one, challenges should be viewed skeptically).
37. 110 S. Ct. at 816 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S.
522, 530 (1979)).
38. Id. at 817.
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State courts are, of course, free to construe their own state
constitutional protections more expansively than the Court inter-
prets parallel or textually identical provisions of the federal Con-
stitution.39 Thus, some state courts have held that the use of pe-
remptory challenges to exclude potential jurors on the basis of race
and various other grounds such as national origin, religion, or sex,
violates the cross-section requirement of their state constitutions. 0
B. Peremptory Challenges and the Equal Protection Clause
The Supreme Court considered the discriminatory use of pe-
remptory challenges in the 1965 case of Swain v. Alabama.4 ' In
that case, Swain claimed the prosecutor's use of six peremptory
challenges to exclude every black juror violated the Equal Protec-
tion Clause."2 Despite the fact that no black had served on a jury
in the county for at least fifteen years, 3 the Court rejected Swain's
Equal Protection claim because he did not show that the prosecu-
tor "in case after case, whatever the circumstances, whatever the
crime and whoever the defendant or victim may be,"" was respon-
sible for removing blacks from the venire.
The Swain decision was widely criticized for the heavy burden
it placed on defendants attempting to prove discriminatory use of
peremptory challenges.46 In the twenty-one years following the de-
cision only two defendants successfully established a prima facie
39. See William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual
Rights, 90 HARV. L. REv. 489, 495 (1977) (discussing the "new federalism").
40. See People v. Wheeler, 583 P.2d 748, 761 (Cal. 1978) (prohibiting exclusion on "ra-
cial, religious, ethnic, or similar grounds"); Riley v. State, 496 A.2d 997, 1012 (Del. 1985)
cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1022 (1986) (prohibiting exclusion of jurors solely on the basis of
race); State v. Neil, 457 So. 2d 481, 486 (Fla. 1984) (prohibiting peremptory challenges of
"distinctive racial groups" on the basis of race); Commonwealth v. Soares, 387 N.E.2d 499,
516 (Mass. 1979) (prohibiting exclusion based on "sex, race, color, creed or national origin");
State v. Gilmore, 511 A.2d 1150, 1159 (N.J. 1986) (prohibiting exclusion on the basis of
"race, color, creed, national origin, or ancestry"); State v. Aragon, 784 P.2d 16, 20 (N.M.
1989) (adopting the rationale of Wheeler); see also State v. Superior Court, 760 P.2d 541,
546 (Ariz. 1988) (prohibiting discriminatory exclusion of a member of "any substantial and
identifiable class of citizens" based on the Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution).
41. 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
42. Id. at 221.
43. Id. at 205.
44. Id. at 223-24.
45. Id.
46. See Brian J. Serr & Mark Maney, Racism, Peremptory Challenges, and the Demo-
cratic Jury: The Jurisprudence of a Delicate Balance, 79 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 13
n.69 (1988)(listing various criticisms of Swain).
[Vol. 23:2520
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showing of discriminatory use of peremptory challenges.47 Finally,
in 1986, the Court in Batson v. Kentucky," lightened Swain's evi-
dentiary burden by allowing a defendant to establish an Equal
Protection violation based on the prosecutor's use of peremptory
challenges at the defendant's trial alone rather than on a history of
systematic exclusion.49
Under Batson, a defendant must first make a prima facie
showing that the prosecutor has used peremptory challenges to ex-
clude potential jurors on the basis of their race.5 0 The burden then
shifts to the state to come forward with a race-neutral explanation
for excluding the jurors. 1 This explanation need not rise to the
level of a challenge for cause, 52 but it must be related to the partic-
ular case.53 Finally, the trial court will determine if the defendant
has met the burden of proving purposeful racial discrimination. 54
Because the trial court in Batson had flatly rejected the de-
fendant's objection to the removal of all blacks from the jury, the
question of the appropriate standard of review of a trial court's
determination on discriminatory intent was not directly before the
Court.5 5 However, the Court did treat the matter of a prosecutor's
discriminatory intent as a factual inquiry, indicating that because
it would largely be a credibility determination, the trial court's
finding would be entitled to great deference on review.5
Like Swain,57 the Batson decision has been the subject of
much criticism, beginning with the separate opinions of Justice
Marshall58 and Chief Justice Burger.59 On the one hand, Chief Jus-
tice Burger argued that Equal Protection analysis is simply inap-
47. See Theodore McMillian & Christopher J. Petrini, Batson v. Kentucky: A Promise
Unfulfilled, 58 UMKC L. REV. 361, 365 (1990) (citing State v. Brown, 371 So. 2d 751, 754
(La. 1979); State v. Washington, 375 So. 2d 1162, 1164-65 (La. 1979)).
48. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
49. Id. at 96.
50. Id. Originally, under Batson the defendant had to prove that he or she was a mem-
ber of the same cognizable racial group whose members were excluded. Id. However, in Pow-
ers v. Ohio, 111 S. Ct. 1364 (1991), the Court held that a defendant of any race has standing
to raise the equal protection rights of an excluded juror. Powers, 111 S. Ct. at 1373.
51. Batson, 476 U.S. at 97.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 98.
54. Id.
55. See id. at 100.
56. Id. at 98 n.21.
57. 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
58. 476 U.S. 79, 102 (1986) (Marshall, J., concurring).
59. Id. at 112 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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plicable6 ° to peremptory challenges because peremptory challenges
"are often lodged of necessity, for reasons 'normally thought irrele-
vant to legal proceedings or official action, namely the race, reli-
gion, nationality, occupation or affiliations of people summoned for
jury duty.' ",' The Chief Justice praised the peremptory challenge
because it " 'allows the covert expression of what we dare not say
but know more 'often than not is true.' "62 In other words, it allows
attorneys to act on stereotypes without having to articulate them.6 3
By contrast, Justice Marshall argued that the decision did not
go far enough.6 4 He contended that, "Any prosecutor can easily as-
sert facially neutral reasons for striking a juror, and trial courts are
ill equipped to second-guess those reasons. ' e5 Because of the inher-
ent potential for racial exclusion using peremptory challenges, Jus-
tice Marshall offered an alternative solution: eliminate the peremp-
tory entirely from criminal cases.66
In assessing lower courts' implementation of Batson, many
critics have reiterated Justice Marshall's concerns, particularly
that prosecutors will easily be able to assert a race-neutral reason
for exclusion. One commentary notes that in practice "trial judges
accept virtually any explanation offered. '6 7 Examples of accepted
reasons include: the potential juror did not have enough eye con-
tact with the prosecutor;68 the potential juror made too much eye
contact with the prosecutor; 9 the prosecutor did not like the ju-
rors' behavior or appearance; 70 the prospective jurors lived in the
same or similar neighborhood as the defendant;7 1 and the prospec-
tive juror had a poor attitude.72 Additionally, one commentator has
'suggested that "because the prosecutor's credibility is an impor-
tant factor in the trial judge's determination, Batson findings al-
60. Id. at 123.
61. Id. (quoting Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 220 (1965)).
62. Id. at 121 (quoting Barbara Allen Babcock, Voir Dire: Preserving "Its Wonderful
Power", 27 STAN. L. REV. 545, 553-54 (1975)).
63. Id.
64. 476 U.S. at 102-03 (Marshall, J., concurring).
65. Id. at 106.
66. Id. at 107.
67. Serr & Maney, supra note 46, at 43.
68. United States v. Cartlidge, 808 F.2d 1064, 1071 (5th Cir. 1987).
69. United States v. Mathews, 803 F.2d 325, 331 (7th Cir. 1986), rev'd on other
grounds, 485 U.S. 58 (1988).
70. United States v. Allen, 666 F. Supp. 847, 853 (E.D. Va. 1987); United States v.
Biaggi, 673 F. Supp. 96, 105 (E.D.N.Y. 1987).
71. Taitano v. Commonwealth, 358 S.E.2d 590, 592-93 (Va. Ct. App. 1987).
72. United States v. Vaccaro, 816 F.2d 443, 457 (9th Cir. 1987).
522 [Vol. 23:2
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most always are upheld by higher courts."' 3 Others conclude that
the protection offered by Batson has been "largely illusory"74 and,
like Justice Marshall," advocate eliminating peremptory chal-
lenges to avoid potential racial discrimination.7 6
III. HERNANDEZ V. NEW YORK: A BARRIER OR A BRIDGE?
In assessing Hernandez's Batson claim, the Court refused to
disturb the trial court's finding that the prosecutor's explanation
was not race based. 77 Despite the fact that ninety-six percent of
Hispanics in Brooklyn, where the trial took place, speak Spanish78
and the possibility that a high percentage of bilingual jurors would
hesitate when asked if they could accept the interpreter as "the
final arbiter" of what was said, the Court found that it is ulti-
mately the prosecutor's intent, not the disparate impact of the ex-
clusionary criterion that matters.7
The Court stated that "nothing in the prosecutor's explana-
tion shows that he chose to exclude jurors who hesitated in answer-
ing questions about following the interpreter because he wanted to
prevent bilingual Latinos from serving on the jury."80 The defend-
ant must be able to show a discriminatory intent in the prosecu-
tor's explanation itself for the explanation to fail the race-neutral-
ity test. As the literature on Batson demonstrates, attorneys who
are aware of the Batson requirements will seldom proffer an expla-
73. M. Elizabeth Kirkland, Comment, Rebutting the Inference of Purposeful Discrimi-
nation Under Batson v. Kentucky, UMKC L. REV. 355, 359 (1989).
74. McMillian & Petrini, supra note 47, at 371; see also Kirkland, supra note 73, at 367
(concluding that discriminatory uses of peremptory strikes persists, unabated by Batson);
Serr & Maney, supra note 46, at 62-63 (arguing that, although it is still too early to conclude
that Batson is a total failure, its implementation so far has been a failure).
75. Batson, 476 U.S. at 107.
76. See, e.g., McMillian & Petrini, supra note 47, at 374; Rosemary Purtell, Comment,
The Continued Use of Discriminatory Peremptory Challenges After Batson v. Kentucky: Is
the Only Alternative to Eliminate the Peremptory Challenge Itself?., 23 NEw ENG. L. REV.
221, 257 (1988); Marvin B. Steinberg, The Case for Eliminating Peremptory Challenges, 27
CRiM. L. BULL. 216, 227 (1991). Cf. Robert W. Rodriguez, Note, Batson v. Kentucky: Equal
Protection, the Fair Cross-Section Requirement, and the Discriminatory Use of Peremp-
tory Challenges, 37 EMORY L.J. 755, 793-94 (1988) (advocating a reduction in the number of
peremptories allowed and an expanded voir dire to better determine challenges for cause).
77. 111 S. Ct. at 1867.
78. Brief for Petitioner at 10, Hernandez v. New York, 111 S. Ct. 1859 (1991) (No. 89-
7645).
79. Hernandez, 111 S. Ct. at 1867-68.
80. Id. at 1868.
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nation that exhibits overt discriminatory intent."
Once a prosecutor comes forward with a race-neutral explana-
tion, the court must still determine if the stated reason is a mere
pretext for racial discrimination.2 The Court treats this as a "pure
issue of fact, subject to review under a deferential standard."83 The
demeanor of the attorney is said to often be "the best evidence 8
for this determination.s Because only the trial court can observe
the demeanor of the attorney, the deferential review standard
applies.88
The Court acknowledged that the prosecutor's proffered rea-
son may have been a pretext because "it would be common knowl-
edge in the locality that a significant percentage of the Latino pop-
ulation speaks fluent Spanish. ' 87 But, applying the "clearly
erroneous" standard of review, the Court did not effectively in-
quire into the possibility of a pretext.
Singling out only certain jurors for special questioning
designed to evoke a specific response is a factor tending to show
that a proffered race-neutral explanation is pretextual8 a Yet the
Hernandez Court did not mention the lack of evidence that the
prosecutor asked non-Hispanic jurors about either their Spanish
81. See, e.g., Serr & Maney, supra note 46, at 59 (noting that virtually all published
opinions in which the prosecutor failed to articulate acceptable reasons applied Batson ret-
roactively to cases tried, but not decided, prior to the Batson decision's release); supra notes
67-72 and accompanying text.
82. Hernandez, 111 S. Ct. at 1868.
83. Id. at 1869.
84. Id.
85. Id. This conclusion is arguable. It seems odd that if two prosecutors were to exclude
jurors under the same circumstances, and for the same stated reasons, one of them would
lack discriminatory intent because she calmly gives her explanation, whereas the other, who
appears nervous or stumbles over his words, would not. The only difference between the two
cases is the attorney's ability to appear calm.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 1868. Courts have recognized that because language ability is so closely re-
lated to race, language-based classifications may sometimes serve as proxies for race-based
distinctions. See, e.g., Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad, 271 U.S. 500, 514 (1926) (holding that a
statute which prohibited keeping business records in certain languages violated the equal
protection and due process rights of Chinese merchants because the vast majority of them
spoke only Chinese); Olagues v. Russoniello, 797 F.2d 1511, 1521 (9th Cir. 1986) (applying
strict scrutiny to a voter fraud investigation because it targeted voters who requested bilin-
gual ballots, had recently registered to vote, and who were foreign born and noting that
"persons of different nationalities are often distinguished by a foreign language"); Gutierrez
v. Municipal Court, 838 F.2d 1031, 1039 (9th. Cir. 1988)(arguing that because language is an
"identifying[] characteristic," English-only rules which have a negative effect on bilinguals
"may be mere pretexts for intentional national origin discrimination").
88. State v. Slappy, 522 So. 2d 18, 22 (Fla. 1988).
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language ability or their ability to accept the official translation. 9
Moreover, the question posed to the Hispanic jurors was an inher-
ently difficult one, practically mandating a hesitant or even a nega-
tive response. In effect, the Spanish-speaking jurors were asked to
promise unconditional acceptance of the official English interpreta-
tion even if it differed clearly and significantly from what they
heard the witness say in Spanish.90 Nonetheless, the Court noted
that "[t]he trial judge in this case chose to believe the prosecutor's
race-neutral explanation" 91 and then refused to overturn the trial
court because it was not "'left with the firm conviction that a mis-
take ha[d] been committed'" in this case.92
The emphasis on the subjective intent of the prosecutor, espe-
cially given the requirement that the defendant somehow demon-
strate that intent to the trial judge, not only places a heavy burden
on the defendant, but ignores the possibility of unconscious racism
in either the prosecutor or the judge. We live in a modern, pluralis-
tic society that condemns overt racism. Consequently, many of
these attitudes will be repressed and disguised. 3 Charles Lawrence
explains:
[R]equiring proof of conscious or intentional motivation as a
prerequisite to constitutional recognition that a decision is race
dependant ignores much of what we understand about how the
human mind works. It also disregards both the irrationality of
racism and the profound effect that the history of American race
89. Cf. People v. Hernandez, 552 N.E.2d 621, 628 (N.Y. 1990) (Kaye, J., dissenting),
aff'd sub nom. Hernandez v. New York, 111 S. Ct. 1859 (1991). At the trial, defense counsel
objected generally to the exclusion of Latino jurors and charged that the prosecutor feared
Hispanics would be sympathetic to the defendant, an objection which, the trial court found,
lost force since the victims were Hispanic as well. Hernandez, 111 S. Ct. 1865. The defend-
ant proffered no additional evidence of discriminatory intent. Id. The lesson for defense
counsel is that, even where peremptory challenges have a discriminatory impact, in the face
of a proffered non-racial reason, the burden of production falls on the defendant.
90. The potential jurors were not presented with any option if they had a difficulty with
the translation. Hernandez, 111 S. Ct. at 1868.
91. Id.
92. 111 S. Ct. at 1871 (quoting United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S.
364, 395 (1948). The Court appears to admit the difficulty of establishing a judicial mistake
when it cites Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935), as an example of how incredible the
evidence must be to establish an erroneous conclusion by the trial court. Hernandez, 111 S.
Ct. at 1871. In Norris, uncontroverted testimony established that no black had served on
any jury in Jackson County, Alabama within the memory of witnesses who had lived there
all their lives. 294 U.S. at 591.
93. Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 356 (1987).
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relations has had on the individual and collective unconscious."4
A standard that requires proof of discriminatory intent cannot be-
gin to address the problem of unconscious racism. The ease with
which a prosecutor may proffer an explanation that does not
demonstrate discriminatory intent combined with a standard of re-
view that generally leaves the trial court's findings untouchable af-
fords little appellate protection against the discriminatory use of
peremptory challenges.
The Hernandez Court offered little guidance to trial courts on
what factors tend to indicate a discriminatory intent. It did how-
ever, note that, "If a prosecutor's explanation for the exclusion re-
sults in the disproportionate exclusion of members of a certain
race, the trial judge may consider that fact as evidence that the
prosecutor's stated reason constitutes a pretext for racial
discrimination."9 5
Additionally, despite the Court's hands-off approach, the case
offers valuable insights as to why excluding bilingual jurors may
not be wise. For example, along with his recognition of the impor-
tance of language to concepts of personhood and community 6 Jus-
tice Kennedy realized that it "is a harsh paradox that one may
become proficient enough in English to participate in a trial, only
to encounter disqualification because he knows a second language
as well."'9 7 He also offered an alternative to excluding bilingual ju-
rors-the trial court should permit them to discretely inform it of
any difficulty with the translation."' The alternative was backed by
the observation that insistence on striking Spanish-speaking jurors
despite this measure would be a factor for the trial court to con-
sider in assessing the discriminatory intent of the prosecutor's pe-
remptory challenge. 9  Efforts such as these indicate that, although
the Court is unwilling to find peremptory challenges of bilingual
jurors unconstitutional, per se, it expects trial courts to diligently
guard against discriminatory language-based exclusions. 00
94. Id. at 323.
95. 111 S. Ct. at 1868.
96. See supra note 13.
97. 111 S. Ct. at 1872.
98. Id. at 1868.
99. Id.
100. Justice Stevens, with whom Justices Blackmun and Marshall agreed, simply found
the prosecutor's explanation insufficient to dispel the "inference of existing racial animus"
inherent in the challenge. Hernandez, 111 S. Ct. at 1877 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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This view comports with Powers v. Ohio,"' in which the Court
found that the individual juror, not just the defendant, has a legal
right not to be excluded from a jury on the basis of race. 102 Writing
for the Court, Justice Kennedy highlighted the important role ju-
ries play in our society. He noted that, "[W]ith the exception of
voting, for most citizens the honor and privilege of jury duty is
their most significant opportunity to participate in the democratic
process."' 03 The harm from discriminatory exclusion is not limited
to the defendant. It extends to the excluded juror and her percep-
tions of the judicial system, undermining her belief in its fairness;
the remainder of the jury might well lose confidence in a system
that tolerates discriminatory exclusions; and ultimately, the entire
community might suffer diminished respect for the criminal justice
system.'0 4
A recent study of voluntary excuses from jury duty based on
economic hardship provides some tentative empirical support for
the theory that discrimination results in loss of confidence in the
legitimacy of the jury system.10 5 Past research had revealed that,
after voir dire, the economic excuse is the most significant determi-
nant of ultimate jury composition. 06 In this study, researchers
looked at a variety of factors including race, sex, economic status,
ethnic background, and language to ascertain the structural causes
for these self-imposed juror exclusions. 07
Among their findings were: white and English-speaking jurors
are more likely to request economic excuses regardless of their ac-
tual financial situation; 108 jurors who are less fluent in English are
more likely to be excused for failure to meet the English compe-
tency requirement for jury service; 09 and jurors who speak English
at home are more likely to request economic excuses than non-En-
101. 111 S. Ct. 1364 (1991).
102. Id. at 1370.
103. Id. at 1369.
104. Id. at 1368-69.
105. Hiroshi Fukurai & Edgar W. Butler, Organization, Labor Force, and Jury Repre-
sentation: Economic Excuses and Jury Participation, 32 JURIMETRICS J. 49 (1991).
106. Id. at 51-53.
107. Id. at 53.
108. Id. at 67. This could be explained by the fact that, in addition to financial hard-
ship, many white and English-speaking potential jurors perceive jury duty to be a nuisance
rather than a democratic privilege and therefore intentionally avoid service with economic
excuses. Id.
109. Id. at 64.
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glish speakers.110 Although no definitive causal relationship was es-
tablished for the last finding, the researchers suggested that the
reasons might be that potential jurors who lack English-language
ability are unfamiliar with the jury system and feel a greater obli-
gation to participate in the process.1
Given the long history of racial discrimination that led to the
Batson decision, this study poses a dual irony: On one hand, it sug-
gests a certain cynicism among those who are familiar with, and
have thus seen discrimination at work in the system. 2 They do
not share the democratic view that jury service is a right and a
privilege of citizenship.11 3 On the other hand, it shows that the sys-
tem is structurally biased against those persons who want to par-
ticipate in what they see as a civic responsibility and are willing to
serve in spite of potential economic hardship. Whatever the reason,
it seems that language-based exclusions not only result in dispro-
portionate jury representation, but that they tend to discourage
participation by those who still see the democratic ideal as a
possibility.
Because of its reluctance to interfere with and articulate crite-
ria to assist lower courts in determining discriminatory intent, on
one level, the Hernandez opinion appears to raise a barrier to the
full inclusion of minority jurors. Yet, at a more fundamental level,
the Court's expression of the valuable role bilinguals play in bridg-
ing language communities sends a message to lower courts that
they should guard against such exclusions to prevent language
from becoming a source of cultural division.
IV. LANGUAGE COMMUNITIES, OBJECTIVITY, AND INTERPRETATION
A disturbing theme running through Hernandez, and possibly
the reason the Court's opinion seems so equivocal, is the notion
that jurors must adhere to the "official translation." Unexamined,
it reasserts itself throughout all three opinions. Justices Kennedy
and O'Connor both agree that the prosecutor's concern over a bi-
lingual juror's hesitancy to accept the official translation is a non-
racial basis for exclusion."1 4 Justice Kennedy goes so far as to sug-
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 60 n.18.
113. Id. at 50.
114. 111 S. Ct. at 1867-68. Justice O'Connor appears to draw a strict line between lan-
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gest that this corresponds to a challenge for cause.1 5 Conversely,
Justice Stevens' opinion ignores the issue, except to suggest that
less drastic means than juror exclusion are available, including his
"even more effective solution"-employing a translator who, alone,
hears and simultaneously translates the witness's words, thus
preventing the jury from hearing anything but the official
translation."6
The assumption that a juror must be able to accept the "offi-
cial translation" and that a bilingual juror's perceived inability to
accept the official translation is a sufficient reason for exclusion
implies that some jurors will be able to "accept" an official transla-
tion or record in a way that others will not, and that the accept-
ance of an official interpretation will lead to greater objectivity in
judgment. However, much modern language theory recognizes that
observers (readers, listeners, jurors) do not simply objectively per-
ceive the world around them; rather they "shape facts . . . accord-
ing to their own preconceived categories. 11 7 In this sense, all ob-
servers are actually interpreters.118 To say that no interpretation
guage and race, asserting that this justification, while, perhaps, "acting like" a race-based
strike, is "not based on race." Id. at 1874 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
115. Hernandez, 111 S. Ct. at 1868.
116. Id. at 1877 n.2 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Actually, this solution masks a great deal
of violence. It would literally force the jury to adhere to the "official translation" by physi-
cally separating and silencing the voice of the witness, and deafening the jury to it. It dis-
empowers jurors and ignores their function as fact finders by denying them the autonomous
use of an important sensory avenue by which they make credibility determinations-voice
pitch, speech rate, intensity, tone volume, hesitation, and so forth. Cf. Capt. Jeffrey D.
Smith, The Advocate's Use of Social Science Research into Nonverbal and Verbal Commu-
nication: Zealous Advocacy or Unethical Conduct, 134 MIL. L. REV. 173, 175 (1991) (dis-
cussing paralinguistic studies on listeners' perceptions of speaker credibility and
persuasiveness).
117. Joan C. Williams, Critical Legal Studies: The Death of Transcendence and the
Rise of the New Langdells, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 429, 445 (1987) (discussing developments in
twentieth century linguistics).
118. See id. at 454 (After about 1970, "scholars began to argue that neither scientific
nor nonscientific disciplines could gain access to objective truth, but instead could only pro-
vide interpretations of 'texts.' ").
For example, in the field of literary criticism, a movement called "reader-response" crit-
icism emerged in the 1970s which "focuses on what the texts do to--or in-the mind of the
reader, rather than looking at a text as something with properties exclusively its own." Ross
C. MURFIN, JOSEPH CONRAD, HEART OF DARKNESS: A CASE STUDY IN CONTEMPORARY CRITICISM
140 (1989). Stanley Fish, a leading reader-response critic argues that there is no such thing
as an objective text and that the text is really a product of interpretation. STANLEY FISH, Is
THERE A TEXT IN THIS CLASS? 16-17 (1980). Hans-Georg Gadamer, a hermeneuticist, asserts
that "the being of a work of art ... must be perceived by the spectator to be actualized ...
[and] all literary works of art are actualized only when they are read." HANS-GEORG
GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD 164 (Joel Weinsheimer & Donald G. Marshall trans., 2d rev.
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can be completely objective does not mean that everybody is free
to give any meaning to a given text or dialogue, but that "there is
no objective description of reality separate from our conceptual
schemes."11 In the context of jury selection, it has been recognized
that "people do have their own perspectives-based on their differ-
ent lives-and . . . only by balancing these perspectives can we
hope to achieve [the] impartiality''120 required by the Sixth
Amendment.1
Language and ethnicity are closely related factors in forming
cultural perspectives and establishing distinctive interpretive com-
munities. For example, Edward Sapir observed that "no two lan-
guages are ever sufficiently similar to be considered as representing
the same social reality. The worlds in which different societies live
are distinct worlds, not merely the same world with different labels
attached. 1 22 Although the degree and manner in which language
shapes consciousness are matters for intense debate 23 current lin-
ed., The Crossroad Publishing Corp. 1991) (1960). He further notes that, "[r]eading with
understanding is always a kind of reproduction, performance, and interpretation," id. at
160, and argues that "the interpreter [may not] speak of an original meaning of the work
without acknowledging that, in understanding it, the interpreter's own meaning enters as
well," id. at 576.
119. Steven L. Winter, Transcendental Nonsense, Metaphoric Reasoning, and the
Cognitive Stakes for Law, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1105,'1131 (1989). Winter's position is actually
on the side of the larger philosophical debate which holds that certain universal conceptual
schemes transcend language and shape our conception of the world. Cf. WILLARD VAN OR-
MAN QUINE, WORD AND OBJECT 75 (1960) ("[W]e may meaningfully speak of the truth of a
sentence only within the terms of some theory or conceptual scheme.")
120. VAN DYKE, supra note 36, at 12.
121. See supra part II.A.
122. EDWARD SAPIR, CULTURE, LANGUAGE AND PERSONALITY 69 (1964).
123. Linguist Benjamin Whorf maintained that language is not only related to culture
but could actually mold the thought of its habitual users. BENJAMIN LEE WHORF, Language,
Mind and Reality, in LANGUAGE, THOUGHT, AND REALITY: SELECTED WRITINGS OF BENJAMIN
LEE WHORF 252 (John B. Carroll ed., 1956). The Whorfian notion of linguistic relativism has
been subject to much criticism, and is today largely discredited, at least in its extreme form.
However, the original popularity of Whorf's work did much to spur study and debate over
the precise nature of the connection between language, culture, and conceptualization. See
PAUL HENLE, LANGUAGE THOUGHT AND CULTURE 23 (1966) (finding Whorf's evidence "strik-
ing" yet questioning just how much it shows); JULIA M. PENN, LINGUISTIC RELATIVITY VERSUS
INNATE IDEAS (1972) (providing a critical historical account of the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis
and the studies that followed its articulation). Others maintain that "language and culture
are inseparably interrelated," Bill Piatt, Toward Domestic Recognition of a Human Right
to Language, 23 Hous. L. REV. 885, 896 (1986), and that "[clonceptualization on any consid-
erable scale is inseparable from language," QUINE, supra note 119, at 3. But see DONALD
DAVIDSON, INQUIRIES INTO TRUTH AND INTERPRETATION at xviii (1984) ("Language is not a
screen or filter through which our knowledge of the world must pass."); DONALD DAVIDSON,
On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme, in INQUIRIES INTO TRUTH AND INTERPRETATION
183-98 (1984).
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guistic thought recognizes that "each language is constituted by,
expresses, and reproduces a particular intelligibility."' 24 In other
words, each language represents only one of an infinite number of
possible understandings. 2 5
If all observers are interpreters, the exclusion of bilinguals
simply closes off one perspective, thereby limiting the interpretive
base of the jury. Impartiality, in these terms, is based on a reflec-
tion of "the range of the community's attitudes.' 1 26 The Court's
effort to secure acceptance of an "official translation" at the ex-
pense of excluding this minority perspective conflicts with the
ideal of a jury drawn from a representative cross-section of the
community, that "essential component of the Sixth Amendment
right to a jury trial.' 27 Far from protecting the hypothetical objec-
tivity of the "official translation," exclusion invites an imbalanced
and partial interpretation. 12
In this view, the official translator is incapable of rendering a
completely objective interpretation. In an extensive study of court
interpreters, Susan Berk-Seligson observes that:
Whereas court personnel assume that the interpreter is nothing
short of a machine that converts the . . . foreign language testi-
mony of non-English speaking witnesses into English for the
benefit of the court, the output of the machine is by no means
perfect, nor can it ever be, because of the problems inherent in
the interpreting process.2 9
For instance, interpreters sometimes make "pragmatic" alterations
of the testimony by making it either more or less polite, more or
124. Richard Hyland, Babel: A She'ur, 11 CARDOZO L. REV. 1585, 1594 (1990).
125. Id.
126. VAN DYKE, supra note 36, at 18.
127. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 528 (1975).
128. Cf. Commonwealth v. Soares, 387 N.E. 2d 499, 515 (Mass. 1979) (arguing that
since "[nlo human being is wholly free of ... interests and preferences," it is "the very
diversity of opinion among individuals, some of whose concepts may well have been influ-
enced by their group affiliations," that helps to ensure impartiality). The California Su-
preme Court made the point in a slightly different context in People v. Wheeler, 583 P.2d
748 (1978), when it explained:
[T]he primary purpose of the representative cross-section requirement. . . is to
achieve an overall impartiality by allowing the interaction of diverse beliefs and
values the jurors bring from their group experiences. Manifestly if jurors are
struck simply because they may hold these very beliefs, such interaction be-
comes impossible and the jury will be dominated by the conscious or uncon-
scious prejudices of the majority.
Wheeler, 583 P.2d at 761.
129. SUSAN BERK-SELIGSON, THE BILINGUAL COURTROOM 2 (1990).
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less formal, by introducing hedges, or by changing the tense of the
verb. 130 According to Berk-Seligson, professional interpreters pay
slight attention to the problems of pragmatic alterations,31 yet
pragmatic alterations affect the listener's perception of the wit-
ness's truthfulness, persuasiveness, intelligence, and competence.
132
Berk-Seligson also asserts that "an interpreter who has either un-
conscious or conscious biases can take full advantage of such lin-
guistic mechanisms to suit her own purposes, and .. .the inter-
preter's interpretations can and do .. .slant what a speaker is
trying to say."133
The Court's suggestion that jurors must be able to confirm,
without hesitation, their acceptance of the official translation or
risk exclusion 1 implies that the official translation warrants such
deference, and that it is generally more accurate than the bilingual
juror's understanding. But, what assurances do we have of the offi-
cial translation's accuracy? One possibility might be certification
that court interpreters meet minimum training and competency
standards. For instance, federal certification as a court interpreter
requires that a person pass an examination covering both written
and oral language skills.' The test is rigorous: it has a ninety-six
percent failure rate. 36 As of 1986 the United States had only 200
active federally-certified interpreters. 137 Very few states have com-
parable certification programs.1 8 Consequently, few courts have
any real control or knowledge about the quality of the interpreters
130. Id. at 194-95.
131. Id. at 2.
132. Id. at 196.
133. Id. at 2-3.
134. Hernandez, 111 S. Ct. at 1868.
135. The Federal Court Interpreters Exam is mandated by the Court Interpreters Act,
28 U.S.C. § 1827 (1978). See BERK-SELIOSON, supra note 129, at 36.
136. BERK-SELIGSON, supra note 129, at 36.
137. Carlos A. Astiz, But They Don't Speak the Language JUDGES J., Spring 1986, at
32, 35.
138. California and New York have such programs. William E. Davis, Language and
the Justice System: Problems and Issues, 10 JUST. Sys. J. 353, 360 (1985). Others are being
contemplated by Florida, Illinois, Iowa, Minnesota, New Jersey, and Utah. BERK-SELIGSON,
supra note 129, at 40.
Florida's Racial and Ethnic Bias Study Commission found that most of Florida's 39
judicial circuits lack any training or certification criteria for interpreters, leaving the selec-
tion of qualified interpreters to the discretion of the trial judge. FLORIDA SUPREME COURT
RACIAL AND ETHNIC BIAS STUDY COMMISSION, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 14 (Dec. 11,
1991). The Commission concluded that this is one reason the needs of Florida's linguistic
minorities have not been met. Id. at 18.
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they use.""9
Once the trial has ended, few means are available to verify the
accuracy of courtroom translations because court proceedings are
transcribed as if everything had originally been said in English; no
record of the foreign language testimony remains.1, 0 Not only does
this make it virtually impossible to prove any error in the transla-
tion on appeal, but it makes it difficult to ensure a high-quality
interpretation"" since translations are effectively not subject to
review.
Jurors who speak the same language as the witness and who
can hear the unmediated version of the testimony may be better
equipped than those who are not part of the language community
to understand what the witness is trying to convey. 1 2 If provided
with the opportunity to direct the attention of the court to ques-
tionable translations, such jurors may, in fact, serve as a check on
the quality of the official translation.
Indeed, one of the jury's primary functions as a fact finder is
to evaluate the witness's credibility, an evaluation which necessa-
rily depends, in part, on the witness's use of language. The use of
language is one reason we have a rule against hearsay.'" The hear-
139. The possibility that a witness testifying in a foreign language will understand En-
glish sufficiently to correct any errors the interpreter makes is rare. It also has certain inher-
ent problems. Consider what happened during a Cuban immigrant's trial on felony automo-
bile tampering charges: The defendant, who claimed not to speak English, testified in
Spanish. When the interpreter incorrectly relayed his answers, he shouted, "I didn't say
that!" The jury convicted him, and he was later indicted on perjury charges for claiming he
spoke only Spanish. Lapse into English Helps Land Spanish-Speaker Behind Bars, MIAMI
HERALD, Feb. 8, 1992, at 11A.
140. BERK-SELIGSON, supra note 129, at 200.
141. Id.
142. See Developments in the Law-Race and The Criminal Process, 101 HARv. L.
REV. 1472, 1559 (1988) (arguing that "[an] all-white jury simply may not understand the
language involved in the case and may act on this misunderstanding to the detriment of the
minority defendant" and "that when white jurors are unable to understand the testimony of
minority defendants, they may conclude that the defendants are ignorant or unable to speak
'English' and therefore more likely to be guilty.")
In a related context, the Dade County School Board, in Miami, Florida, recently hired
bilingual psychologists to test children for learning problems. The reason they gave for this
is that when a psychologist does not speak the language of the child and is forced to use a
translator, the psychologist runs the risk of misreading the student's behavior as a learning
problem. Such misread behavior includes a child's lack of eye contact that may be read as
disrespectful or inattentive but is in fact a culturally correct way for a child to relate to
adults. Charisse L. Grant, School Board to Find Psychologists to Help Kids in Their Native
Tongues, MIAMI HERALD, Nov. 7, 1991, at 4B.
143. "Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by these rules or by other rules
prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority or by Act of Congress."
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say rule excludes out-of-court statements to give the trier of fact
"the benefit of having the declarant before it, under oath, and sub-
ject to contemporaneous cross-examination,"' 4 4 thus enabling the
juror to put a proper value on the testimony.' 46 In this evaluative
process "T [the trier of fact] must . . . ask whether W [the wit-
ness] by use of this sentence means to convey to T what T would
have meant if T had used the same words. If not, just what does he
mean to convey? The answer will depend upon T's deduction as to
W's use of language. 114" If T, the juror, and W speak the same
language, T will be better able to evaluate W's use of language.
V. AN ALTERNATIVE TO JUROR EXCLUSION
The trial court in Hernandez used the most restrictive means
to guard against the perceived problem of a bilingual juror failing
to accept the official version of foreign language testimony. It ex-
cluded the juror. To ensure that the jury includes a range of per-
spectives, a trial court should employ a nonrestrictive, nondiscrimi-
natory alternative to exclusion if one is available. This Section
explores Justice Kennedy's suggestion in Hernandez that jurors be
allowed to inform the court of a difficulty with translation, rather
than be excluded.1 47
The Court cites United States v. Perez'48 to demonstrate the
type of problem that might arise when a juror fails to accept the
official translation of foreign language testimony.' 49 In Perez, the
following exchange took place:
DOROTHY KIM (JUROR NO. 8): Your Honor, is it proper to
ask the interpreter a question? I'm uncertain about the word La
Vado [sic]. You say that is a bar.
THE COURT: The Court cannot permit jurors to ask questions
directly. If you want to phrase your question to me-
DOROTHY KIM: I understand it to be a restroom. I could bet-
ter believe they would meet in a restroom rather than a public
bar if he is undercover.
THE COURT: These are matters for you to consider. If you
FED. R. EVID. 802.
144. MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, EVIDENCE 62 (2d ed. 1989).
145. EDMUND M. MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE 243 (1963).
146. Id.
147. 111 S. Ct. at 1868.
148. 658 F.2d 654 (9th Cir. 1981).
149. Hernandez, 111 S. Ct. at 1867 n.3.
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have any misunderstanding of what the witness testified to, tell
the Court now what you didn't understand and we'll place the-
DOROTHY KIM: I understand the word La Vado [sic]-I
thought it meant restroom. She translates it as bar.
MS. IANZITI: In the first place, the jurors are not to listen to
the Spanish but to the English. I am a certified court
interpreter.
DOROTHY KIM: You're an idiot. 50
After further questioning, the witness indicated that none of the
conversations at issue had occurred in the restroom. 51 Ms. Kim
was later dismissed from the jury because the judge believed "Kim
had formed an opinion about the course of events at issue and had
developed feelings of anger for either the defendant, the prosecu-
tion or the proceedings in general."' 152
The Perez juror was not dismissed because she had a differ-
ence of opinion about the translation but, as the Perez court
stressed, due to "the form and procedure of Kim's conduct and the
trial court's perception that Kim was both angry and opinion-
ated. 1 53 Only after the outburst did the trial court instruct the
members of the jury on what to do if they detected a discrepancy
in the translation. The judge explained that any juror who under-
stood the testimony of Spanish-speaking witnesses to differ from
the interpreter's translation should bring the matter to the court's
attention at the conclusion of the witness's testimony.' 5 4
It is possible that the juror may in fact be correct in his or her
understanding and, through the proper procedure, may clarify a
150. Hernandez, 111 S. Ct. at 1867 n.3 (1991) (quoting United States v. Perez, 658 F.2d
654, 662 (9th Cir. 1981)).
151. Perez, 658 F.2d at 663.
152. Id. at 663. The Perez case itself demonstrates how interpretation through a third
party may affect a credibility determination. The trial judge did not hear Dorothy Kim call
the interpreter "an idiot." He was later told this by the court reporter (presumably the same
reporter who prepared the official transcript quoted by the Court in Hernandez). Perez, 658
F.2d at 663. Kim claimed her statement wasnot "you're an idiot," but, "it's an idiom." Id.
Thus, even though the parties to the exchange were speaking the same language, the judge
was forced to rely on an interpreter, the court reporter, for the content of Kim's statement,
which he found "disturbing." Id. at 663. Although the judge's decision to dismiss Kim did
not turn on this factor alone, it certainly played a part in his decision. Quite possibly, Kim
did say "it's an idiom" and the court reporter heard "you're an idiot;" nothing suggests that
either of them misrepresented the facts as they perceived them. The point, however, is that
the trial judge interpreted the events based on the reporter's interpretation, which may it-
self have been incorrect.
153. Perez, 685 F.2d at 663.
154. Id. at 662-63.
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misleading translation. This happened in Santana v. New York
City Transit Authority.155 In Santana, a Spanish-speaking woman
sued for injuries she sustained when the subway car in which she
was riding stopped suddenly. 156 When asked how quickly the train
stopped, the plaintiff's answer, as translated by the interpreter,
was that the train stopped as if it had bumped into something. 15 7 A
bilingual juror who was familiar with the dialect spoken by the
plaintiff, believed that she had really meant that it felt as if the
train had crashed rather than merely bumped into something.158 In
a note, he asked permission to meet with the judge on this matter.
At a subsequent meeting with the judge, the interpreter, the court
reporter, and counsel, the juror explained his difficulty with the
translation. After the trial resumed, the plaintiff was questioned
again. It was revealed that she had meant that the train had felt as
though it had crashed, rather than bumped into something.159
The Santana case demonstrates that a policy seeking to ex-
clude those who speak the same language as the witness, may ex-
clude the very people who will be able to understand the testimony
more accurately. It also illustrates a procedure that minimizes dis-
ruption and allows the trial to proceed with a record that more
closely reflects the statements of the witnesses.
For such an optimal result, jurors must be properly instructed.
For example, they may be instructed that if they disagree signifi-
cantly with a translation, they may, when the witness is finished
testifying, bring the matter to the attention of the court by ex-
plaining the nature of the difference in writing and giving it to the
court officer. The court, after consulting with counsel beyond the
hearing of the jury, could then seek to clarify the testimony by
questioning the witness or, if there is an objection, the court may
seek first to explore the nature of the difficulty further by meeting
with the court interpreter, counsel, and the juror in chambers.6 0 If
155. 505 N.Y.S.2d 775 (Civ. Ct. 1986).
156. Id. at 777.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 778.
160. Compare this procedure to other recommended procedures for jurors to propose
questions for the witness: United States v. Polowichak, 783 F.2d 410, 413 (4th Cir. 1986);
United States v. Callahan, 588 F.2d 1078, 1086 (5th Cir. 1979); State v. Le Master, 669 P.2d
592, 597 (Ariz. App. 1983); Rudolph v. Iowa Methodist Medical Ctr., 293 N.W.2d 550, 556
(Iowa 1980); Rood v. Kansas City, 755 P.2d 502, 505 (Kan. 1988); State v. Johnson, 784 P.2d
1135, 1144-45 (Utah 1989). Cf. Mark A. Frankel, A Trial Judge's Perspective on Providing
Tools for Rational Jury Deeisionmaking, 85 Nw. U.L. REV. 221, 223 (1990). Judge Frankel,
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the court poses further questions to the witness, counsel should
have an opportunity to ask follow-up questions.
A written inquiry procedure decreases the risk of a prejudicial
question or statement during the proceedings." 1 To avoid inter-
rupting the flow of the questioning, jurors would be allowed to ex-
press their concerns only at the end of the witness's testimony.
Potential objections to such an active role of the jury might
include diminished judicial efficiency, or that jurors will become
advocates as opposed to fact-finders. However, proponents of a
more active jury, who would permit jurors to ask questions of the
witnesses through the court in compliance with specific instruc-
tions, argue that the concept of the jury as a responsible decision
maker is advanced by permitting jurors a more active role. 162
Moreover, they report that trials are not lengthened signifi-
cantly,'1 3 that jurors generally do not become advocates,164 and
explains the procedure by which he allows jurors to ask the witness questions as follows:
If the [uror questioning] procedure is approved [by counsel], the jury is given a
preliminary instruction on the subject of asking written question. After each wit-
ness is questioned, the jurors are asked if they wish to ask the witness a written
question. If a juror raises her hand, she is provided with pencil and paper. Ques-
tions are reviewed with counsel outside the hearing of the jury. If there are mi-
nor problems with the form of the question, a revision is developed in consulta-
tion with counsel. If no objections are sustained, I put the question or questions
to the witness. Each lawyer is then given the opportunity to ask follow-up ques-
tions. In the event an objection is sustained, a brief explanation is generally
given to the jury. Objecting counsel is given the opportunity to make a record of
the objection outside the presence of the jury at the next available recess.
Id. at 223.
161. See United States v. Perez, 658 F.2d 654 (9th Cir. 1981). After juror Dorothy Kim
voiced difficulty with the translation, the trial judge explained, "We are obviously going to
break down if individual jurors want to ask questions of the interpreter or the witness di-
rectly.. . . Some of those questions may be what the law declares to be incompetent. That
would result in prejudicial error either to the defendant or to the government." Id. at 663.
162. Steven I. Friedland, The Competency and Responsibility of Jurors in Deciding
Cases, 85 Nw. UL. REV. 190, 206 (1990); see also United States v. Callahan, 588 F.2d 1078,
1086 (1979) ("If a juror is unclear as to a point in the proof, it makes good common sense to
allow a question to be asked about it.. . . Trials exist to develop truth."); Louisville Bridge
& Terminal Co. v. Brown, 277 S.W. 320, 322 (Ky. 1925) (stating that the practice of jurors
asking questions of the witnesses is "likely to aid the jury in finding out and learning the
real facts and especially enabling them to understand the evidence that is being given.");
Frankel, supra note 160, at 225 (jury questioning "enhances the rational aspects of the
jury's fact-finding role"); Scott J. Silverman & Jonathan T. Colby, Expanding the Role of
Jurors in Florida Courts, FLA. B.J., Oct. 1991, at 32, 35 ("Since trials exist to develop the
truth, questions submitted by jurors could aid in that quest. Answers to questions posed by
jurors could make the jurors more informed, and a well-informed jury serves the cause of
justice.").
163. See Larry Heuer & Steven Penrod, Increasing Jurors' Participation in Trials: A
Field Experiment with Jury Notetaking and Question Asking, 12 L. & HuM. BEHAV. 231,
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that a more active jury is more effective. 16 5
The procedure outlined above gives jurors a judicially-sanc-
tioned channel in which to direct frustration or confusion caused
by a discrepancy between what their senses tell them and what
they are told by the official translator. 6 ' The added benefit is that
it obviates the potential that the bilingual juror may have an un-
due influence on the rest of the jury by presenting an alternative
version of the testimony that is at odds with the official transla-
tion.167 If the jury is properly instructed to raise difficulties with
the translation at the end of the witness's testimony, then a bilin-
gual juror will have no need, during deliberation, to say "the wit-
ness really said X even though the translator said Y." This matter
will already have been dealt with during the trial itself.
255 (1988) (study of 67 trials in Wisconsin circuit courts revealing that juror questioning did
not substantially slow trials); see also REPORT OF COMMITTEE ON JURIES OF THE JUDICIAL
COUNCIL OF THE SECOND CIRCUIT 55-58 (1984), excerpt reprinted in 73 ILL. B.J. 155 (1984)
(out of 26 trials where jurors were permitted to ask questions, jurors chose not to ask any
questions in nine trials, asked only three or fewer questions in 15 trials, asked 40 questions
in one trial and 56 in another); Friedland, supra note 162, at 218 (citing Root, Judge Will
Allow Questions by Jurors, PITT. PRESS, Sept. 6, 1984 (noting a judge found no increase in
length of trials when jurors were allowed to ask questions)).
164. Frankel, supra note 160, at 222. Judge Frankel bases this conclusion on his ten
years of experience allowing witnesses to ask written questions of witnesses. Id.
165. Franklin Delano Strier, Through the Jurors' Eyes, 74 A.B.A. J., Oct. 1, 1988 at 79,
80-81 (in a survey of 2,533 jurors asking what changes would make the evidence clearer to
the jury, the most frequent suggestion was to allow jurors to ask questions of the parties
with court approval). Although lawyers participating in a study of 67 trials in Wisconsin
circuit courts indicated that juror questions did not raise significant issues at trial, the ju-
rors were more confident that they had sufficient information to reach a responsible verdict.
Heuer & Penrod, supra note 163. Additionally, according to the study, lawyers found that
the jurors' questions provided useful feedback about the jurors' perceptions of the trial and
that the trial was not significantly slowed by the questions. Id. The lawyers did not feel that
the questions interfered with their trial strategy or prejudiced their clients. Id.
166. The trial court should instruct the jury in appropriate procedure any time a wit-
ness will testify through an interpreter, regardless of what languages the court or counsel
believe the jurors understand. This is-for two reasons. First, a juror may not be sufficiently
proficient in a language to be considered "bilingual," but may understand just enough of the
witness's testimony, as relayed directly by the witness, to sense a conflict between the "offi-
cial version" and the witness's version. Second, stereotypes are often wrong. For example,
the blond-haired, blue-eyed juror with the light complexion whom no one even thought to
ask, may turn out to be quite well-versed in Spanish, Japanese, or even sign language. Ei-
ther one or both of these considerations may have been at work in the case of Dorothy Kim,
the Perez juror. See United States v. Perez, 658 F.2d 654 (9th Cir. 1981).
167. Some might argue that, just as physicians can be excluded from medical malprac-
tice trials, or psychologists should not sit on juries where the defendant's sanity is an issue,
so too should bilingual jurors be excluded where foreign language testimony will be given.
The analogy, however, is flawed; professionals excluded on the basis of their specialized
knowledge do not generally represent a unique cultural viewpoint or one in danger of being
marginalized by the majority community.
HERNANDEZ v. NEW YORK
VI. CONCLUSION
Willingness to exclude jurors to ensure the acceptance of an
official translation that remains largely unverifiable reflects a pref-
erence for an "official translation" at the expense of an accurate
one. Whatever its intent, the exclusion of language groups has a
disparate impact on minority groups. Criteria such as hesitation
and eye contact are too vague and subjective to protect against the
discriminatory exclusion of ethnic minorities from juries.
In the Hernandez case, excluding bilingual jurors on the basis
of their ability to defer to the official translation was, at worst, a
pretext for racial and ethnic discrimination. At best, it was a mis-
guided effort to preserve the supposed objectivity of the testimony.
In fact, no univocal understanding of testimony is possible or de-
sirable, since all observers interpret their experience. Rejecting the
interpretive community formed by a language group closes off a
valuable cultural perspective. Rather than excluding jurors who
form part of an interpretive community, courts should instruct
them on how to properly handle a perceived difference between the
testimony and the translation.
The American jury is an institution of democracy and justice;
impartiality is an essential precondition to its legitimacy. But a
jury is impartial only if it reflects the range of values of the com-
munity from which it is drawn. 16s The cross-section requirement
aims at unbiased inclusion of the broad range of the community's
attitudes and cultures.'6 9 Because they constitute a significant part
of our modern communities we cannot, at the same time, exclude
language cultures, and expect to maintain the impartiality and in-
tegrity of the jury. Although perhaps blinded in its misguided ef-
fort to preserve a chimerical official translation, the Hernandez
court recognized the value of bilinguals as inhabitants of two lan-
guage communities and the danger of permitting language to be-
come a source of division170
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